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Abstract 
 
This article examines the prospects for the UN at its 75th anniversary. First, it questions the 
conflation of “universalism” – the founding principle of the UN, with “Liberal International 
Order” (LIO), which is conventionally credited to the US and its Western allies. Second, it opens 
up unrecognized and forgotten voices, especially of women and non-Western advocates, behind 
the making of the UN and its key normative principles. Third, the article looks at the changing 
nature of “world order” resulting from a variety of forces, such as the shift in power, constraints 
on global hegemony, proliferation of consequential actors, the changing nature of 
interdependence and globalization, the devolution, fragmentation and pluralization of global 
governance, and the multiple ideational and ideological undercurrents of world politics. Against 
this backdrop, the final part of the article selectively looks at some of the key areas of UN reform 
that might render the organization closer to its original ideal of universalism while also adapting 
it the realities of the 21st century. 
 
Universalism Versus the Liberal International Order (LIO)  
 
Gambia is very, very poor... they are kept down because of exploitation….[we need to 
be] against the exploitation of the poor by the rich – by governments as well as 
individuals.  I think we can get somewhere if we keep that idea of being against… 
exploitation everywhere. It will be an awfully good thing for all of us.” (Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, US President, in 1944)1 
 
As the war has developed and the danger of a possible victory of the fascist powers has 
receded, there has been a progressive hardening and a greater conservatism in the leaders 
of the United Nations. The four freedoms and the Atlantic charter, vague as they were 
and limited in scope, have faded into the background, and the future has been envisaged 
more and more as a retention of the past…the hundreds of millions of Asia and 
Africa…have become increasingly conscious of themselves and their destiny…They 
welcome all attempts at world co-operation and the establishment of an international 
order, but they wonder and suspect if this may not be another device for continuing the 
old domination. (Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian anticolonial leader and future Prime Minister, 
in 1944)  
 
                                                 
1 Roosevelt 1944a. See also Roosevelt 1944b. 
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The future does not belong to globalists; it belongs to patriots. (Donald Trum, US 
President, 2019)3 
 
Although the UN was conceived as a “universal” organization, it’s origin and maintenance has 
been credited almost exclusively to the Liberal International Order created and dominated by the 
US and the West. As this narrative goes, the UN and its family of institutions like the IMF, 
World Bank and GATT were established as a US-led Western project in shaping which Western 
liberal norms and institutional choices played the leading, almost exclusive role. This view 
conflates universalism with hegemonic stability. Hence, it’s not surprising that there is much 
pessimism today about the future of UN and multilateralism. Since the UN and the LIO are 
viewed as one and the same, the decline of the LIO are seen as leading to the collapse of 
universalism and multilateralism. 
But this view is misleading. The above-cited words of FDR and Nehru, both expressed in 
1944 but from radically different vantage points – the former at the height of his political life as 
the leader of the most powerful nation on earth, the other in prison for his struggle against British 
colonial rule – suggest that a very different view of the relationship between universalism and 
the LIO is warranted.  
A little historical background in in order. To say that 2020 marks the 75th anniversary of 
the UN, hence this special issue of Global Governance, is only a half truth. The formal origins of 
the UN we know today should be dated from New Year’s Day 1942 with the Declaration by 
United Nations of 26 states; rather than the orthodox account which starts with the conversations 
of the future P5 at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and the San Francisco conference that created the 
Charter in 1945.4 In this 1942 Declaration, FDR insisted that China be included as one of the top 
four powers, and that still colonized India be treated as if it were independent. How indeed could 
Nehru refer in 1944 to the development of the United Nations up to that time, when the UN 
Charter was not agreed until the following year? While Nehru would soon grow concerned about 
the loss of the original UN spirit and the return of power politics,5 both FDR and Nehru (who is 
sometimes labeled in the West as a Liberal despite his very obvious socialist leanings) viewed 
universalism in broader and more inclusive terms than FDR’s successors, starting with Harry 
Truman. Moreover, Nehru’s fears in 1944 would soon be justified as the US- and Soviet Union-
led blocs would quickly sideline the fundamental spirit of universalism for sake of their 
ideological and geopolitical interests in the Cold War. 
Taking this as the stating point, we argue in this essay against the frequent conflation 
between the LIO and universalism. This is for three main reasons. First, the LIO was not a 
universal order. Indeed, after Trump’s election as the US President, some of the leading 
proponents of the LIO concede this. A key advocate, Joseph S. Nye, writes that the LIO “was 
largely limited to a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral” and “did not 
include many large countries such as China, India, and the Soviet bloc states, and . . . did not 
always have benign effects on nonmembers.” 6 This echoed Acharya’s earlier contention that not 
only the universality of the LIO was a “myth”, since “the Soviet bloc, China, India, Indonesia, 
and a good part of the ‘third world’ were outside of it”, but also that the LIO was “not so benign 
                                                 
3 Trump 2019. 
4 Plesch 2010a; Plesch and Weiss 2015 
5 Nehru 2003, 539.  
6 Nye 2017. 
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for many outside of it, especially in the developing world”.7 Hence the LIO should be seen as an 
“international order, but not the world order, of the post-World War II period.” This point is 
reinforced by the presence of these non-Western states in the power structures of the United 
Nations; the dynamics between a Western LIO and the wider UN system being a key feature of 
the past 75 years.  
A second fact that questions the conflation of the UN and the LIO is that the former was 
founded with both liberal and non-liberal ideas, including socialist, communitarian and 
conservative ideas. Some of these spilled over into the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
While Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the Commission drafting the Declaration in 1947, the Vice-
Chairman was Peng Chung Chang of China (then Republic of China), and Charles Malik of 
Lebanon served as the Rapporteur. Malik was instrumental in drafting the terms of the 
Declaration and defending it against competing communitarian ideas (which came from China). 
As Adami reminds us Islamic and other non-Western women also played important roles in the 
UDHR.8 Mrs Roosevelt recalled in her memoirs: 
 
Dr. Chang was a pluralist and held forth in charming fashion on the proposition that there 
is more than one kind of ultimate reality.  The Declaration, he said, should reflect more 
than simply Western ideas and Dr. Humphrey [Director of the UN’s Human Rights 
Division and a member of the Commission], would have to be eclectic in his 
approach.  His remark, though addressed to Dr. Humphrey, was really directed at Dr. 
Malik, from whom it drew a prompt retort as he expounded at some length the 
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.  Dr. Humphrey joined enthusiastically in the discussion, 
and I remember that at one point Dr. Chang suggested that the Secretariat might well 
spend a few months studying the fundamentals of Confucianism! 
 
What is interesting here is that both sides of what came to be known as the “universalism- 
relativism” debate in human rights, were at this point led by non-Western countries. But there 
were also ideational differences within the West including the US. In the formative years of the 
LIO, the US was led by both Democratic (Roosevelt and Truman) and Republican (Eisenhower) 
administrations, with marked different views about multilateralism and universalism, which is 
sometimes under-emphasized by the proponents of the LIO.  As noted, FDR’s conception of 
international order was more inclusive, whereas the Truman/Eisenhower approach was a 
narrower, more geopolitical and US-centric version.  African and African American human 
rights presented an integrated threat to white Washington with some amelioration in the FDR 
era.  Increasingly, as the Cold War progressed, the LIO became associated with US hegemony, 
neo colonialism and then neo-liberalism, thereby vindicating Nehru. 
While ‘exploitation’ was the key concept that Franklin Roosevelt urged on delegates to 
the 1944 meeting of the International Labor Organization in Philadelphia, no U.S. President 
since has expressed such a view. The UN Charter in its economic and social sections, as well as 
the founding purposes of the World Bank and the IMF also made social security, full 
employment and labor conditions strategic objectives. But these were to give way to 
development through GDP growth and on channeling strategic aid to anti-communist 
postcolonial states. Hence, liberalism in the LIO today is far more restricted concept than 
liberalism was in 1944; FDR himself avoided labels.  
                                                 
7 Acharya 2014, 40.  
8 Adami 2018. 
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Lastly, the UN of the 1942-1945 era had a larger constituency of agency than the US-
centric narrative of the founding of the LIO. That narrative  eclipsed the contemporary reality. 
While Nehru was writing from prison about “the hundreds of millions of Asia and 
Africa…[welcoming] all attempts at world co-operation and the establishment of an international 
order”, scores of diplomats and soldiers from Latin America, Asia, Africa and Middle East were 
already playing and would continue to play an active role in building the UN-based international 
order, alongside the Western countries.  Among these were Asian and other non-Western 
contributions to the founding structures of the UN, and to issues ranging from war crimes policy 
to the status of women.  
To understand these forgotten or suppressed dynamics it is first necessary to engage in 
archaeology of the origins in the UN in early 1940s.  
 
Restoring the UN’s Archaeology   
 
There is no question that American, and to some degree British and Soviet, leadership drove the 
wartime UN from 1942 onwards; but non-Western agency also shaped them and is imbedded in 
the core foundations of UN institutions and policy.  
Throughout the war China was represented at multilateral conferences on Food, 
Economic and Monetary Policy, on the future international organization and as we shall see on 
war crimes. China’s activism in International Criminal Law in WW2 was extensive and early in 
a period when Anglo-American activism was conflicted and late, despite the dominance of the 
Nuremberg narrative. In January 1942 the European refugee governments in London issued a 
joint statement at St James’s Palace on Punishment for War Crimes. This made clear that the 
crimes of the Nazis required innovation in international law and sought to create an international 
system of peer review to provide legitimacy to national prosecutions. China immediately 
expressed support, declared that the subjugation of peoples through the dissemination of 
narcotics should be considered a crime and its intention to initiate proceedings against the 
Japanese. Neither the UK, the U.S. or even the USSR ever adhered to the declaration. 
Nevertheless, by the end of 1942 the Anglo-American governments9 had been pressured by these 
states and their own civil society to agree to create a UN Commission to investigate war crimes. 
China was a founder member of the Commission, and by the summer of 1944, had created a war 
crimes sub commission in Nanking which included 11 allies and considered thousands of cases. 
The Commission was innovative in developing international law. For example, it routinely 
endorsed the sporadic charges for rape brought by its member states. 
India, as noted, was considered as an independent state in the Declaration by United 
Nations of January 1942 and consequently participated in the intra-war UN conferences on Food 
and Agriculture in 1943, on post war aid and reconstruction in 1944, at Bretton Woods and San 
Francisco. By the time of the first session of the UN General Assembly a transitional Indian 
government had had six years of experience in multilateral negotiations. India famously 
protested South African racial laws in 1946 at the first meeting of the UN General Assembly 
before it was an independent state. India had already by this time helped lead innovation in 
International Criminal Law. These efforts included an Indian-US joint effort in proposing joint 
military tribunals – subsequently deployed most famously at Nuremberg and Tokyo, but also in 
hundreds of trials across Europe and Asia. India supported the Commission’s decision to support 
war crimes indictments against Italians, brought by Emperor Haile Selassi’s Ethiopia. Italy 
                                                 
9 Plesch 2010b; Plesch and Weiss 2015. 
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refused to extradite the accused to Ethiopia according to its obligations under the 1947 peace 
treaty. Ethiopian agency at this time and it suppression is the opposite of  twenty first century 
complaints from the West over African inaction on war crimes. 
The issue of gender equality is often regarded as a white Western conception. In reality 
from the UN Charter through the UDHR, non-Western agency has been important and at times 
crucial to the development of gender equality in the international system. Conventional wisdom 
will tend to attribute these achievements to Eleanor Roosevelt. Or when considering the UN 
Charter, to the South African Field Marshal Smuts’ Preamble to the Charter and the presence of 
a female US delegate Virginia Gildersleeve. Recent research11 reveals a radically different 
picture. At San Francisco as delegates gathered for the UN Conference on International 
Organization in April 1945 there was a women’s lobby. The negotiating record and 
contemporary accounts concur in attributing gender equality in the Charter to the role of two of 
the four women who were formal national delegates. Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican 
Republic and crucially the Brazilian, Bertha Lutz.  Invoking  women’s contribution to victory in 
the war, Lutz led the battle in Committee where she was credited with “Lutzwaffing” her 
opponents. Without gender equality in the Charter and especially in Article VIII governing the 
UN’s own processes it is hard to see any roots taking hold from which the present growth in 
gender equality could have grown. 
Non-Western and female representation is also under-reported in foundational accounts 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adami has amended the record to show the role 
of women including Bernardino, Hansa Mehta from India, and Begum Shaista Ikramullah from 
Pakistan who succeeded in securing gender equal language in the Declaration.12  
These insights into the foundations of the UN structures and ideas are indicative and not 
exhaustive. A broader and deeper study should examine how Liberia and Haiti amongst others 
sent funds to help rebuild Europe and China. The belated unearthing of non-Western agency in 
the creation of the UN system carries a broader significance as we interpret the intellectual 
archaeology. The victory over Fascism is almost universally now recorded as an Allied rather 
than a UN victory as it was at the time, and the national military contributions are correctly given 
pride of place. But they have overshadowed the egalitarian and at times trans-national ideology 
that motivated peoples and troops.  
 
Back to the Present: The Changing World Order  
 
World order refers to the broad interplay of power distribution, ideas, institutions and 
interactions that characterize a significant portion of the world at a given time. The contemporary  
world order is increasingly defined by the following characteristics:  
• The end of the unipolarity. There are severe constraints on any single power – either the 
US or China - exercising global hegemony in the manner of Britain before World War I 
and the US after World War II. The caveat is that US military power might remain 
unmatched  
• The proliferation of consequential actors. These are not just great powers or 
“rising/emerging” powers, but also international and regional bodies, non-state groups, 
corporations, and people’s networks, empowered by social media. This does not mean the 
                                                 
11 Luhr Dietrichson and Sator 2016; Skard 2011. 
12 Adami, 2018 
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“end of the nation-state”, but more complexity than in the age of European multipolarity 
or Cold War bipolarity.  
• Changing nature of interdependence, not just in trade, but also covering investment, 
finance and production networks and supply chains. While under attack by reactionary 
movements, globalization is not over, but may be taking on new forms, driven by the 
rising powers, such as China and India. 
• Devolution, fragmentation and pluralization of global governance. Global governance has 
never been universally admired, nor has it been a linear process. The demand for global 
governance varies with time and issue areas, some areas like trade may seen less demand, 
while other like climate may see more. The architecture of global governance is 
changing; the big multilaterals of the UN system are no longer the only game in town but 
are joined (not displaced) by new and complex types of governance, comprising formal 
institutions, networks, and hybrid public-private partnerships.   
• Persistence of cultural, ideological and political diversity. There is no “end of history”; 
world politics is shaped by multiple ideational and ideological undercurrents: liberal, 
conservative, communitarian, and radical, challenging the idea of a singular approach to 
modernity as developed by the West.   
• Transnational imperilment; while there remains disagreements over the nature and impact 
of new threats there is at least growing realization, backed by evidence that the major 
threats to global stability are not conventional inter-state wars, but intra-state conflicts 
and “non-traditional” threats, such as climate change and other forms of environmental 
degradation, forced migration, pandemics, drug trafficking, people smuggling, violent 
extremism, terrorism, and transnational crime. These are complex sources of conflict that 
may originate from within the boundaries of a state but have a regional or global impact.  
 
This leads to another point; , the emerging world order is not a simply a return to unipolarity, 
bipolarity, multipolarity or liberal hegemony. A word about multipolarity here, since this is the 
default term of most geopolitical pundits these days in describing the new world order. 
Traditionally, “multipolarity”, according to Barry Posen, refers to the “relatively equal 
distribution of capabilities… with three or more consequential powers”.13  Similarly, Zaki Laidi 
defines multipolarity as “a system in which power is distributed at least among 3 significant 
poles concentrating wealth and/or military capabilities” and in which each of these poles is 
“capable of producing order or generating disorder [to] influence…global outcomes beyond its 
own borders”. (emphasis added)14  Yet, we live in a world in which the ability of “producing 
order or generating disorder [to] influence global outcomes” lies not just with great powers 
(even among these power distribution remains asymmetric, rather than equal), but also non-state 
actors such as institutions, corporations,  extremists and social movements using material (wealth 
and military) and non-military (especially new technologies such as artificial intelligence and 
others which have at least a dual use) and ideational resources. Moreover, whereas past 
multipolarity was: managed by great powers through a balance of power system, including the 
19th century Concert system, colonialism, and with few multilateral institutions. The new world 
order is shaped by a greater variety of “consequential” actors.15 
                                                 
13 Posen 2009, 350.  
14 Laidi 2012. 
15 The terms “Multiplex” and “G-Plus” are coined by Acharya, to distinguish multipolarity from the emerging world 
order. Acharya 2014; Acharya 2017. 
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Hence the 21st century world order can be defined as a world order which no single 
power or ideology dominates globally, which is culturally and politically diverse yet deeply 
interconnected and interdependent, and whose main players – both the makers and breakers of 
order - are not just states and the great powers, but also a variety of other consequential actors 
national and international, state and non-state.  
 
Reigniting Multilateralism 
 
What is the future of the UN, and multilateralism more generally, in this changing nature of 
world order? Challenges to multilateralism and the UN abound. Another challenge is reactionary 
politics in Western nations. Yet, there are grounds of hope for the future of the UN.  
First, the demand for multilateralism has varied. In the US, both Reagan and George W. 
Bush administrations retreated from multilateralism, although to a lesser extent than Trump. 
Domestic politics can be a double-edged sword in so far as support for the UN is concerned. 
Here is a striking example; despite Trump’s rhetoric against multilateralism, the US Congress 
has kept funding for the UN stable.16  
Second, the demand for multilateralism is driven by a combination of strategic, normative 
and functional logics. 17 If the idea of multilateralism as good and desirable for its own sake is 
discarded the strategic and functional reasons for it might persist or even increase, to compensate 
for it. Rising powers such as China and India, along with traditional powers, see multilateralism 
as important to their  status and influence.  
Transnational challenges defy national boundaries, which no single nation or bloc can 
solve on its own. This reality does not itself sustain multilateralism, since not all agree on its 
importance. But this also means that the need and demand for multilateralism is not just a moral 
imperative, but also a practical necessity.  
Third, the demand for multilateralism varies across issues. A study published in 2016 
showed that while demand for global governance might be strengthening in climate change, 
human rights, global security governance, and atrocities, it is weakening in health, trade, and 
even possibly finance (where it may be static after having risen in the immediate aftermath of the 
2008 financial turmoil). Also, in some areas, such as trade and finance, the demand for global 
governance is crisis-driven. Understanding these variations across issue areas and time is 
important in making generalizations and devising ways of addressing challenges to the UN and 
its role in global governance.18 
Fourth, while the decentering and fragmentation of multilateralism can create confusion, 
increase transaction costs, and can possibly lead to reduced effectiveness of existing UN-based 
global governance institutions and mechanisms, it is also clear that fragmentation is driven by 
the demonstrated weaknesses and failures of existing mechanisms and their lack of normative 
and performance legitimacy. In this context, the emergence of new actors and frameworks of 
multilateralism due to the proliferation of new actors is not necessarily at the expense of the UN. 
This is not a zero-sum game, but a positive sum one, one that offers considerable scope for 
divisions of labor.  
                                                 
16 In February 2019, the US Congress restored most of the Trump administration’s cuts to the US funding for the 
UN, except to peacekeeping, which was 3% lower than the traditional US share of 27.9% of the UN peacekeeping 
budget). Goldberg 2019. 
17 Acharya 2016. 
18 Acharya 2016. 
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For example, human rights laws today are enforced not only in international courts, but 
also through criminal prosecutions in domestic courts of former state officials, where both 
international law and domestic criminal law are used. The ICC has been joined by more than two 
dozen international enforcement courts in the world enforcing human rights law. This promotes 
human rights around the world. Some bilateral and plurilateral arrangements create stricter 
standards for intellectual property protection and tougher enforcement penalties for intellectual 
property infringement than existing Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property (TRIPs) 
measures. Hence, they support the goals of global trade governance, if not its primary 
multilateral institution. In finance, a key development is the emergence of “cooperative 
decentralization”19 as a form of fragmentation, resulting from the 2008-9 financial crisis. These 
regional and plurilateral financial arrangements worked with the IMF. Opinion is divided on the 
benefits and costs of this form, with critics skeptical of their ability effectively contain crises, 
while others see them as durable and positive forces in global financial regulation. 
 In climate change, the proliferation of initiatives does not replace or weaken the UN’s 
role. At the same time, as academic literature has pointed out, institutions are sticky; it’s easier to 
modify them than to create new ones.20 Hence, as  existing multilateral institutions come under 
pressure, they will not be displaced, but new arrangements may emerge with respect to aspects of 
environmental degradation such as industrial pollution and deforestation. Fragmentation can be 
creative, leading to innovation in problem-solving,  
Fifth, despite the current pessimism about global governance, the demand for multilateral 
action is wider than ever before – a key factor supporting the future of the UN. A good deal of 
recent literature on agency is concerned with the proliferation of actors, especially looking 
beyond the state-centric focus of the early literature to capture the role of transnational civil 
society and the private sector, etc. But the issue of agency goes well beyond bringing the non-
state actors in. Equally importantis that the US role in creating and maintaining the global 
governance architecture has been more limited and less positive, while the contribution of others 
including Europeans and, as discussed earlier in this article, the developing countries (and the 
weaker actors more generally) is less appreciated but more substantial and extensive, than is 
usually captured in the academic literature and policy debate. This is clear in the area of human 
rights, R2P, climate change, and internet governance, the last being an understudied area where 
the US role has come under intense criticism after the revelations by US intelligence analyst 
David Snowden in 2013 of massive and systematic US surveillance of the internet.21  
However, these factors are not enough to the keep the UN going in the long term. 
Critically, leaders must pay more attention to selling the benefits of multilateralism and UN to 
domestic audiences. To this end, a comprehensive and non-partisan assessment audit of the 
benefits of multilateralism for countries is necessary to reduce political partisanship and bias in 
the debate over the necessity and importance of the UN.  
There are many proposals about UN reform and lack of space precludes a detailed 
discussion of these.22 Proposals that seek to the alter the fundamental structure of the UN, no 
matter how desirable for justice and fairness, seem rather unlikely. These include reform of the 
                                                 
19  Helleiner 2016, 178. 
20 Koehane 1984. 
21 Cogburn 2016, 269-70. 
22 See for example, Ponzio et al. 2019. See also, de Coning and Peter 2019. This study draws from the Report of the 
High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO), appointed by former Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon (UN 2014).  UN General Assembly 2015.  
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UN Security Council, where the veto protects the status quo. Obsessing with them is neither 
productive nor necessary for the UN to remain relevant and important. There are other ideas, 
such as expanding the voting share in multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank of countries that are increasingly wealthy and able to contribute to the budget. This will 
become more achievable as the global economic shift continues. The most consequential and 
realizable proposals for reform may be the least publicized or more low-key. These include: 
increasing the space for political solutions to accompany military and technical aspect of peace 
operations; forging greater partnership between the UN and regional bodies; and adapting the 
UN secretariat to be more “field-oriented” and “people-focused”.23 
The UN was designed and has grown organically as a confederation of bodies around the 
core of the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat.  There remains scope for reform 
and re-organization, with for example unified financial and human resource functions. Increasing 
national and civil society engagement provides an additional strategy. Engagement of crowd 
funding of core UN budgets is one idea. At grassroots level the UN remains popular as 
evidenced by  numberless Model UN societies is one route. Another is matching the still 
dominant US financial contribution with those from wealthy states. Qatar, Norway, Lichtenstein 
to name but three could pick up the entire UN core budget. Tripling not cutting the budget would 
be a start. 
UN military and civil intervention forces remain a pale shadow of the founders’ vision. 
Few remember that, sincerely or not, Winston Churchill, called for the British air force to have 
units at the disposal of the Security Council in his Iron Curtain speech in Fulton Missouri. Today 
even UN peacekeeping is an essentially rolling temporary affair. States should commit standby 
forces for UN missions. 
The global democratic deficit undermines the legitimacy of the UN along with the other 
IGOs. The occasional presence of NGOs at the Security Council and in profusion around most 
UN bodies is not enough, since many are corporate fronts or dependent on government and 
agency funding from the bodies they are pressuring. At the international level, states send only 
officials selected from an elite bureaucracy answerable to the nation state government. 
Occasionally political appointees are sent, and elected officials turn up for the grand occasion. 
National electorates could start to directly elect their nations’ representatives to the key decision-
making bodies, which would enhance the legitimacy of the bodies themselves.  
Albert Einstein24 famously observed the bomb had changed everything except the way 
people think. In extremis, Churchill, Stalin and FDR became Kantians of necessity seeking to 
prevent further world wars even before the atom bomb. FDR’s central driver for the UN was to 
have the UN established during the war while such existential threats remained dominant. Today, 
the world faces a different but no less powerful set of existential challenges; the danger of major 
war and climate change can serve as a unifying driver. The values of economic and social 
equality should again drive policy. Western nation’s ostracism of economic and social human 
rights is not sustainable. 
Post-communist efforts to end impunity of human rights violators through the 
International Criminal Court; and at treaty based global weapons controls have stalled and face 
collapse. Two new projects may have the required practical vision.  Justice Richard Goldstone 
and other are proposing a new global effort to complement the International Criminal Court with 
                                                 
23 Peter 2018, 7. 
24 Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 1955. 
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systems of evidence collection, and advice and peer review for national and local processes 
building on the rediscovered practice of the WW2 era.25 
Former President Gorbachev’s latest warning of nuclear war should propel support for 
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. However, requirement of the Charter and the 
demand of the Bandung Conference in 1955 for global governance of all major weapons is 
answered in the draft Treaty on the Strategic Concept for the Removal of Arms and Proliferation. 
Building on best practice in arms control it echoes the global accord in the Paris agreement on 
Climate Change.26 
One should not wait for these challenges to imperil the world to the point of no return 
before reviving it and strengthening it in the face of the current attack from populists and 
“patriots” (to use Trump’s words). At the same time, Nehru’s warning about the great powers’ 
tendency to return to their old manners of powerplay despite an apparent show of unity in facing 
a common danger should remind us that cooperation cannot be based on short-term calculations. 
Great powers, this time including rising powers like India and China, should both lead and be led 
by others to correct the deficit of multilateralism as the world moves through a momentous 
period of both power transition and transnational imperilment.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
25 United Nations War Crimes Commission. www.unwcc.org (accessed 5 November 2019) 
26 SCRAP Weapons. www.scrapweapons.com (accessed 5 November 2019) 
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